IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JUN 3 0 1978

OFFICE OF THE CLERN SUPREME COURT, U.S.

No. 77-7012

CLIFFORD R. COMBS,

Petitioner,

-vs-

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

CLIFFORD R. COMBS, Petitioner,

LEE M. NATION, JAMES W. FLETCHER, Assistant Public Defender

Office of the Public Defende 1305 Locust Street, Suite 20 Community Justice Center Kansas City, Missouri 6410 (816) 474-5811

Counsel for Petitioner

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TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES:

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1075).

Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1381).

State v. Billy Duren, 556 S.W. 2d 11 (Mo. banc 1977).

State v. Gethers, 227 S.E. 2d 832 (Ga. App. 1976).

Robinson v. Kimbrough, 540 F. 2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976).

STATUTES:

Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution

Article I, § 22(b), Missouri Constitution

§ 497.130, Revised Statutes of Missouri

New York Judiciary Law § 543(7)

Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 51-218, -219

Ga. Code Ann. § 59-112(6)

La. Stat. Ann. § 13-3055

Okla. Stat. Ann. Title 38, § 28

R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-9-11

Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-10(14)

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

Petitioner, Clifford Combs, prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals entered in the above-entitled case on February 27, 1978.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion and decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals is reported at 564 S.W.2d 328. A copy of the opinion appears in Appendix A attached hereto.

JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals was entered February 27, 1978. Thereafter, a motion for rehearing was filed on March 14, 1978. See, Missouri Rule of Court 84.17. The motion was overruled April 3, 1978. An application to transfer the cause to the Missouri Supreme Court was filed April 18, 1978. Missouri Rule of Court 83.03. On May 9, 1978 said application was denied by the Missouri Supreme Court, making the opinion of the Court of Appeals the final judgment of the highest court in the State of Missouri.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title 28, United States Code, Section 1257 (3).

QUESTION PRESENTED

WHETHER MISSOURI'S STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME FOR
THE SELECTION OF PETIT JURORS -- WHICH GRANTS WOMEN AN AUTOMATIC
EXEMPTION BASED SOLELY ON SEX -- DENIED PETITIONER HIS RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS MANDATED AND INTERPRETED
BY THIS COURT'S OPINION IN Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 523 (1975).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

Sixth Amendment

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, "

Fourteenth Amendment

"... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

STATEMENT

Petitioner, CLIFFORD COMBS, was charged by information with the crimes of Burglary, Second Degree and Stealing (§560.110 R.S.Mo.). Jury trial was held in the Jackson County, Missouri Circuit Court (Murphy, J.) in Kansas City, Missouri. Verdicts of guilt were returned and Petitioner was sentenced to serve concurrent four-year terms in the Missouri Division of Corrections.

HOW FEDERAL QUESTION IS PRESENTED

1. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to quash the jury panel on the basis that women were systematically excluded from jury service. In support of this motion, petitioner introduced into evidence a stipulation of facts entered into by both the defense and the State. Briefly, the stipulation outlined the jury selection system used in Jackson County, Missouri, which is as follows: potential jurors are randomly selected from the Jackson County voter registration lists; these persons are sent questionnaires to determine their eligibility for jury service. By statute, this questionnaire prominently states:

TO WOMEN:

The Constitution permits women to elect to serve or not to serve as jurywomen. Any woman who elects not to serve will fill out this paragraph and mail this questionnaire to the jury commissioner at once. It will not be necessary to answer the other questions.

I elect not to perform jury service.

This paragraph is immediately followed by a signature line. Those questionnaires returned showing no exemption were placed in the jury wheel. Also stipulated to was the fact that the 1976 jury wheel was 29.1% female. Each week, names are randomly selected for jury service; these persons are then sent a summons for jury service. This summons reads on its reverse side:

Women, if you do not wish to serve, return this summons to the Judge named on the reverse side as quickly as possible.

Petitioner introduced statistics relating to the number of jurors summoned, and those actually appearing for service, during the months of January through June, 1976. Additionally, the stipulation showed that of 30,165 women sent questionnaires (for the 1976 jury wheel), fully 21,884 (72.6%) indicated an unwillingness to serve as jurors by signing the line under the last paragraph of the questionnaire, which informed them of their ability to refuse to serve because of their sex. Lastly, census evidence was introduced showing Jackson County to be 54% female. An example of the stipulation and its supporting documents is attached hereto as Appendix B and made a part hereof by reference.

At the close of Petitioner's presentation of evidence on the Motion, the State offered no evidence and the Motion was overruled.

2. Subsequent to his trial, petitioner filed a timely motion for new trial alleging the instant allegation. A timely appeal was then prosecuted to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, which affirmed petitioner's conviction by opinion dated February 27, 1978. Motion for rehearing was overruled April 3, 1978. Application to transfer the cause to the Missouri Supreme Court was denied May 9, 1978. The issue raised herein was raised and argued before the trial court and the Missouri Court of Appeals, whose opinion has now become the final judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court with the denial of the application to transfer. Missouri Rule of Court 83.03.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The opinion and decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in the instant case is in direct conflict with past decision of this Court, various federal courts of appeals and several state high courts. Specifically, Petitioner contends the instant opinion is in conflict with Taylor vs. Louisiana, 418 U.S. 522 (1975) and thus, cannot stand. Taylor held Article VII, Section 41 of the Louisiana Constitution and Article 402 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure (since repealed) violative of Taylor's due process rights guaranteed by the XIV Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Louisiana law is reproduced here for the convenience of the Court:

Article VII, Louisiana Constitution

§41. Selection of jurors; women jurors; trial by judge; trial by jury.

The Legislature shall provide for the selection and drawing of competent and intelligent jurors for the trial of civil and criminal cases; provided, however, that no woman shall be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed with the clerk of the District Court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to such service. All cases in which the punishment may not be at hard labor shall, until otherwise provided by law, be tried by the judge without a jury. Cases, in which the punishement may be at hard labor, shall be tried by a jury of five, all of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases, in which the punishment is necessarily at hard labor, by a jury of twelve, nine of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases in which the punishment may be capital, by a jury of twelve, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.

Louisiana Codo of Criminal Proceduro

Article 402. Service of women as jurors.

A woman shall not be selected for jury service unless she has previously filed with the clerk of court of the parish in which she resides a written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service.

The United States Supreme Court in Taylor re-examined the question of automatic exclusion of women from the juries previously decided by that Court in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 7 L.Ed.2d 118, 82 S.Ct. 159 (1961) and they reached a different result. Accordingly, the Court stated:

"Accepting as we do however, the view that the VI Amendment affords the Defendant in a criminal trial the opportunity to have the jury drawn from venires representative of the community, we think it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequences are that criminal jury venires are almost totally male."

(42 L. Ed. 2d 690 at 702) [emphasis added]

The question presented herein then whether Missouri offers an "automatic exemption based solely on sex" and if, "the consequences are that criminal jury venires are almost totally male."

The Missouri Constitution, Article I, Section 22(b) states:
"No citizen shall be disqualified from jury service because of
sex, but the court shall excuse any woman who requests exemption
therefrom before being sworn as a juror." This Article is implemented by Section 497.130, Missouri Revised Statutes (1974),
which section allows women to "elect to serve or not to serve as
jury women."

When placed side by side and examined, the Missouri system and the Louisiana system (later changed) both offer an absolute exemption to jury service based strictly upon gender. The difference being only that in Louisiana the woman must affirmatively opt for service while her Missouri sister must affirmatively choose not to serve.

The Appellant's argument is much better stated by the United States Supreme Court's final paragraph in the Taylor opinion:

". . . but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof."

Petitioner concludes that "(t)he States remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions. . " Taylor v. Louisiana, at 538. Petitioner, however, does not believe that a blanket exemption for women is a reasonable exemption. Indeed, as pointed by Mr. Justice Seiler in his dissenting opinion in State v. Billy Duran, 556 S.W.2d 11, 26, n.f (1977):

"The federal court (the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri) provides for excuse on request by a woman charged with care of minor children without adequate domestic help." Petitioner maintains that this is a reasonable exemption for women and would not serve to deny an accused his constitutional right to a representative jury: in the federal court in Kansas City, 53% of the persons on jury wheel are women and 39.8% of the actual jurors chosen were women. 556 S.W.2d at 24. This data can be contrasted with the Missouri courts: 29% of the persons on the wheel are women; seldom over 15% of the persons appearing for jury service are women; and often, as in the case-at-bar, juries are all male.

Since Taylor, several states have been faced with challenges to exemptions to women. All, except Missouri, have changed the exemption by either statute or court decision, see, e.g. State v. Gethers, 227 S.E. 2d 832 (Ga. App. 1976); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 540 F. 2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976); New York Judiciary Law 549(7); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. \$51-218, 219; Ga. Code Ann. \$59-112(6); La. Stat. Ann. \$13-3055; Okla. Stat. Ann. Title 38 §28; Rhode Island Gen. Laws Ann. §9-9-11; Utah Code Ann. §78-46-10(14). Missouri remains the only state with an automatic exemption for women. Further, this exemption causes gross underrepresentation of women on jury panels. (See attached exhibits as to the women appearing for jury service). The instant opinion cannot stand as a correct interpretation of this Court's opinion in Taylor. Unlike the Missouri Supreme Court, Petitioner does not believe Taylor stands for the proposition that any percentages of women on jury panels, higher than those found in Taylor, is constitutionally permissible; instead Taylor condemns jury mechanisms which deny an accused his right to a jury drawn from a reasonable cross-section of society. The Missouri jury selection system is of such a breed: Petitiner's panel (10% women) cannot be considered as representative of society.

Accordingly, a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court affirming Petitioner's conviction.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Patitioner respectfully requests this Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court.

Petitioner

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APPENDIX A

OPINION RENDERED BY THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS, KANSAS CITY DISTRICT, ON FEBRUARY 27, 1978.

APPENDIX A IS THE OPINION OF THE COURT IN STATE OF MISSOURI V. COMES AND CAN BE FOUND AT 564 S.W.2d 328. IT HAS NOT BEEN FILMED HERE.

APPENDIX B

STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY PARTIES AND DOCUMENTS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURI, SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

STATE	OF	MISSOURI,)
		Plaintiff,	}
v.) Docket) Division No
		Defendant.) No.

STIPULATION

Comes now the defendant,

by counsel,

, Assistant Public Defender, and the state, by counsel,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, and stipulate and agree as follows:

- . 1. All persons summoned for jury duty in the year 1976, including the persons summoned as prospective jurors in this case, were selected from a jury wheel created in the following manner:
 - a. Under the direction of the Circuit Court Administrator and the Jury Commissioner, the Department of Court Computer Services created a computer data file containing the name, address, sex and ward/precinct number of every fourth registered voter in Jackson County, Missouri, in the records of the Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners and the Independence Board of Election Commissioners. An Official Notice and Questionnaire in the form prescribed by Section 497.130 of the Missouri Revised Statutes was mailed to each person whose name was selected from the aforesaid list of registered voters.
 - b. Completed questionnaires were received in return mail by employees of the Department of Court Computer Services. The questionnaires are scrutinized to determine if any of the responses shown on the questionnaire indicated that that person was entitled to exemption or to be excused from jury duty. The names of those persons who appeared to be entitled to exemption or to be excused from jury duty were then removed from the role of those persons who were sent questionnaires. The list of remaining names constitutes the jury wheel of 1976.
 - c. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of a "Summary of Questionnaire Processing for the 1976 Jury Wheel" prepared by Robert J. Kramer, Director of Computer Services, which is a summary of the number of questionnaires processed in the compilation of the 1976 Jury Wheel for Jackson County, and said Exhibit "A" may be admitted in evidence in this case.

- d. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of a memorandum showing the number of males whose names are included in the 1976 Jury Wheel for Jackson County and the number of females whose names are included in the 1976 Jury Wheel for Jackson County. Exhibit "B" and the information shown in that exhibit may be admitted in evidence in this case.
- 2. Prospective jurors are summoned as follows:
 - a. Prior to the week for which potential jurors are to be summoned, the presiding judge and the jury commissioner determine the number to be summoned. This number is provided to the Department of Court Computer Services which uses a computer programmed to randomly select the designated number of potential jurors from the 1976 Jury Wheel. The persons so selected are mailed a jury summons identical to the form of summons attached and marked Exhibit "C", which exhibit is hereby incorporated by reference.
 - b. Attached Exhibit "D" (pages 1 through 7), which exhibit is hereby incorporated by reference, is an analysis of the sex and service of potential jurors summoned for each jury week in 1976 through the week of July 26, 1976. The figures contained in Exhibit "D" may be admitted in evidence in this case.
- 3. On February 4, 1976, the Office of the Public Defender for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit was authorized to obtain from the Jackson County Circuit Court Administrator all "Official Notice and Questionnaire" forms which were received, processed and used to compile the 1976 Jury Wheel for Jackson County. On February 11, 1976, the Office of the Public Defender received all such questionnaires from the Office of the Circuit Court Administrator.

The questionnaires were so sorted to separate those sent to males from those sent to females. Questionnaires sent to females were sorted to determine the following information and counted in each category thereby obtaining the following totals:

Category	Total Number of Questionnaires
Information on the face of the questionnaire showing that the woman was no longer a resident	
of Jackson County, Missouri.	817
Female government employees who indi- cated they would not serve	- 21
Female professionals, including clere who indicated they would not serve	gy,

Females who indicated prior jury service on the questionnaire (Line 12) but	
indicated they were willing to serve	132
Females who indicated prior jury service but were unwilling to serve	20
Female teachers who indicated they would not serve	437
Questionnaires indicating that the addressee was in a nursing home	50
Questionnaires indicating in Line 11 that the woman was physically unable to serve or some other written indication of physical infirmity such as loss of hear- ing, or who indicated they were ineligible	
under the statutes	1,106
Questionnaires showing that the woman was over 65 years of age and with no affirmative indication of willingness	
to serve	2,059
Questionnaires showing that the woman was under 21 years of age	151
Questionnaires returned with the notation that the addressee was deceased	53
Questionnaires indicating that the woman declined to serve for no other apparent reason than the female exemption	21,884
Questionnaires with affirmative indi- cations that the woman would serve, or without any indication of refusal	3,342
and and and the of teriodi	3,342

4. The Court may take judicial notice of the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, statistics contained in attached Exhibit "E", which exhibit is hereby incorporated by reference, entitled "General Population Characteristics."

Date

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Jackson County Courthouse 415 East 12th Street Kansas City, Missouri 64106 Counsel for Plaintiff

Date

Assistant Public Defender 1802 Traders Building 1125 Grand Avenue Kansas City, Missouri 64106 474-5811 Counsel for Defendant



CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI

December 29, 1975

415 EAST 12TH STREET

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64106

ROBERT J. KRAMER

DIRECTOR OF COMPUTER SERVICE

815-281-3558

To: Austin E. Van Buskirk

Court Administrator

Re: 1976 Jury Wheel

Attached is the summary of questionnaire processing for the 1976 jury wheel. As you can see, the new wheel will contain a total of 27,868 names. If you need further explanation of the attached summary, please let me know.

Robert J. Kramer

Director of Computer Services

RJK:bf

AUSTIN E, VAN BUSKIRK

COURT ADMINISTRATOR

! mc: John Fitzgerald

AUG 18 1378

MAE RYALS

Exhibi

SUMMARY OF QUESTIONNAIRE PROCESSING FOR THE 1976 JURY WHEEL

Approximate Registered Voters	· 260,913
Caestionnaires Mailed (1/4 voter rolls)	65,207
Deceased and/or Non-Deliverable 2,451 Ineligible/Elected Not To Serve 34,888	
Total Records Removed From File	37,339
	•
1976 Jury Wheel	27,868
Changes to File	
Name Changes Address Changes	167 2,141
Total Changes	2,308
Total Questionnaires Returned	57,457
Number of Questionnaires Not Returned	7,750
	*

MEMORANDUM

June 15, 1976

TO: Th

Thomas M. Larson

FROM:

Charlie Rogers

PF.

Jury Wheel Count

I counted the males and females on the Jackson County Jury Wheel List for 1976, and obtained the following results:

> Males Females Total

This figures out to slightly less than 29.1% of the persons on the jury wheel list who are female.

I spent a total of 13 hours on this project.

Charles M. Rogers Certified Law Intern

19,755 8,099 27,854 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI

Summana far Inry Bernice

To

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to appear before the Honorable PAUL E. VARDEMAN , Judge of DIVISION 03 of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri IN KANSAS CITY AT 12TH & OAK IN RM 301, ON MONDAY THE 15 day of NOVEMBER, 1976 AT 8:15 o'clock AM to serve as a juror until discharged.

BRING THIS SUMMONS WITH YOU.

PLEASE READ THE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSESIDE.

Jury Commissioner

NOVEMBER 15

PLEASE BRING THIS ENTIRE CARD WITH YOU WHEN YOU APPEAR AT THE JURY

ASSEMBLY ROOM.

INSTRUCTIONS

Please note the Judge and location on the front side of this card. You

must report to him on the day and at the time specified.

No male juror shall be excused from service except for sufficiently valid reasons to be APPROVED BY THE JUDGE or upon PERSONAL APPEARANCE BEFORE SAID JUDGE AS SHOWN ON THE FRONT OF THIS CARD. Applications for excuses must be presented to said Judge on or before 12 o'clock noon on the Thursday preceeding the date which you are to appear as shown on the reverse side.

A physically disabled juror must show that to appear and serve would endanger his health. Such proof must be in the form of a doctor's certificate

and be presented to the Judge the same as other applications.

Women, if you do not wish to serve, return this summons to the Judge

named on the reverse side as quickly as possible.

Men, if you are over 65 years of age and do not wish to serve, return this summons to the Judge named on the reverse side the same as other applications, before 12 noon Thursday preceeding your date of service. Give your date of birth in your request.

Non-Residents, if you are no longer a resident of Jackson County, Missouri, you are not eligible for jury service. Please let us know you have moved by returning this summons promptly giving your present address.

All persons duly summoned by mail as jurors may be attached for non-appearance and fined by the court for contempt.

We regret that we are unable to furnish parking for jurors. Please bring this Summons with you when you appear at the Jury Assembly Room.

TABLE OF JURORS SUMMONED IN JACKSON COUNTY FOR SERVICE IN KANSAS CITY - JANUARY, 1976

	WEEK	JURORS	SUMMONED	EXCUSED OR DECEASED	DEFERRED	ABSENT	APPEARED	FOR SERVICE
	1/5/76 Male Femal Total	$e \frac{80}{327}$	(75.5%) (24.5%)	70 49 119	19 2 21	6 17 23	152 12 164	(92.7%) (7.3%)
_	1/12/76Male Femal Total		(76.5%) (23.5%)	64 48 112	25 1 26	24 12 36	147 19 166	(88.6%) (11.4%)
•	1/19/76Male Femal		(76.3%) (23.7%)	71 45 116	18 0 18	$\begin{array}{c} 14 \\ \underline{10} \\ 24 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 142 \\ \underline{21} \\ 163 \end{array}$	(87.1%) (12.9%)
	1/26/76Male Femal Total		(72.0%) (28.0%)	85 44 129	12 2 14	15 18 33	122 27 149	(81.9%) (18.1%)
_	TOTALS FOR Male JANUARY Fema 1976 Total	986 1e <u>327</u> 1,313	(75.1%) (24.9%)	290 186 476	74 5 79	59 57 116	563 79 642	(87.7%) (12.3%)

TABLE OF JURORS SUMMONED IN JACKSON COUNTY FOR SERVICE IN KANSAS CITY - FEBRUARY, 1976

	WEEK OF		JURO	RS SUMMONED	EXCUSED DECEASED	DEFERRED	ABSENT .	APPEARED SERVICE	
	2/2/76	Male Female	224 92 316	(70.9%) (29.1%)	64 46 110	26 4 30	16 12 28	$\begin{array}{c} .118 & (7) \\ 30 & (2) \end{array}$	(9.7%) (0.3%)
_	2/9/76	Male Female Total	243 87 330	(73.6%) (26.4%)	66 48 114	18 1 19	23 10 33		
	2/17/76	Male Female Total	120 59 179	(67.1%) (32.9%)	35 37 72	13 1 14	4 5 9		(1.0%) (9.0%)
	2/23/76	Male Female Total	235 101 336	(69.9%) (30.1%)	59 53 112	19 2 21	7 19 26		34.7%) 15.3%)
_	TOTALS FOR FEBRUARY 1976	Male Female Total	822 339 1,161	(70.8%) (29.2%)	224 184 408	76 8 84	50 46 96		32.4%) 17.6%)

		TABULATION	OF	DATA	OBTAINED	FROM	LISTS	OF	JURORS	SUMMONED	FOR	MARCH,	1976.	
ček eginning:								9						
edring.		Jurors							-	2.2	٠,	Not-		

		Summoned	(%)		Excused	Deferred	Not Appearing	Appeared For Service	(%)
rch 1, 76.	Female :	90 231	(72.0%) (28.0%)		56 64	21	13 20	19 126	(13.1%) (86.9%)
	Total	321			120	23	33	145	- •
ch 8,	Female Male	107 228	(31.9%) (68.1%)		67	. 2	9 9	32 115	(21.8%) (78.2%)
	Total	335			131	39	18	147	
ch 15,	Female Male	107 228	(31.2%) (68.8%)		62 58	3 23	17	25 140	(15.23) (84.83)
	Total	343			120	26	32	165	
ch 22,	Female Male	50 142	(26.0%) (74.0%)	٠.	27 40	17	8 9	14 76	(15.6%) (84.8%)
	Total	192	•		67	18	17	90	
ch 29,	Female Male	99 247	(28.6%) (71.4%)		65 70	. 27	11 :	20 140	(12.5%) (87.5%)
	Total	346			135	. 30	21	160	
al for ks of ch, 1976.	Female Male	453 1,084	(29.5%) (70.5%)		274 299	11 125	58 63	110 597	(17.0%) (83.0%)
	TOTAL	1,537		100	573	136	121	707	
							5	4	

TABLE OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR DUTY IN KANSAS CITY, APRIL, 1976.

week of	*	Summoned	, Excused	Deferred Not Appearing	Appeared For Service
4/5/76	Male Female Total	248 (71.1%) 101 (28.9%) 349	65 51 116	29 1 30 14 29	139 (79:9°) 174 (20:1°)
4/12/76	Male Female Total	254 (72.2%) 98 (27.8%) 352	72 51 123	21 13 0 17 21 30	148 (83.1%) 30 (16.9%) 178
4/19/76	Male Female Total	235 (70.6%) 98 (29.4%) 333	67 54 121	21 12 2 21 23 33	135 (86.5%) 21 (13.5%) 156
4/26/76	Male Female Total	121 (74.74) 41 (25.34) 162	23 23 29 lixenred	14 ,	380 (90.0%)
TOTALS FOR APRIL, 197	Female	858 7 (71.7%) 11. 4	in : 233 (** (** . / 179 412	85 7. 46 3 62 88 108	494 (84.0%) 94 (16.0%) 588

TABLE OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR DUTY IN KANSAS CITY, MAY, 1976

Week of		Summoned	(1)	Excused	Deferred	Not Appearing	Appeared for Service
5/3/76	Male Female Total	240 90 330	(72.7%) (27.3%)	60 48 108	17 2 19	15 18 33	148 (87.1%) 22 (12.9%) 170
5/10/76	Male Female Total	236 89 325	(72.7%) (27.3%)	52 .56 108	27 0 27	12 15 27	145 (89.0%) 18 (11.0%) 163
5/17/76	Male Female Total	231 87 318	(72.6%) (27.4%)	56 52 108	29 2 31	12 12 24	134 (86.5%) 21 (13.5%) 155
5/24/76	Male Female Total	239 82 321	(74.5%) (25.5%)	53 43 96	26 1 27	13 13 26	147 (85.5%) 25 (14.5%) 172
Totals for May, 1976	Male Female	946 348	(73.3\$) (26.7\$)	221 199	99 5 104	52 58 110	574 (87.0%) 86 (13.0%) 660


TABLE OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR DUTY IN KANSAS CITY, JUNE, 1976

Week of	•	Su	mmoned	(\$)	Excus	ed I	eferred	Not	Appearing	Appea	red for Service
6/1/76	Male Female Total		217 86 303	(71.6) (28.4%)	54 42 96	+ 1	29 4 33		12 14 26		22 (82.4%) 26 (17.6%) 48
6/7/76	Male Female Total		255 77 332	(76.8%) (23.2%)	51 41 92		35 1 36		13 10 23		56 (86.2%) 25 (13.8%) 81
6/14/76	Male Female Total		124 53 177	(70.1%) (29.9%)	25 33 58	00	18 1 19		5 8 13		76 (87.4%) 11 (12.6%) 87
6/21/76	Male Female Total	•	254 81 335	(75.8%) (24.2%)	77 50 127		33 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		10 18 28		34 (92.4%) 11 (7.6%) 45
6/28/76	Male Female Total	7	258 84 342	(75.4%) (24.6%)	60 47 107		40 0 40		19 11 30		39 (84.2%) 26 (15.8%)
Totals for June, 1976	Male Female Total		,108 381 ,489	(74.4%) (25.6%)	267 213 480		155 8 163		59 61 120		27 (86.4%) 99 (13.6%) 26

TABLE OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR DUTY IN KANSAS CITY, JULY, 1976

Week of		Summoned (%)	Excusod	Deferred	Not Appearing	' Appeared for Sorvice
7/6/76	Male Female Totale	241 (76.0% 76 (24.0%) 74) 50 124	23 1 24	12 9 21	132 (89.21) 16 (10.21) 148
7/12/76	Male Female Total	244 (73.5% 88 (26.5% 332) 79) 57 156	27 1 28	12 10 22	126 (86.3%) 20 (13.7%)
7/19/76	Male Female Total	216 (74.5% 74 (25.5% 290	53) 41 94	33 4 37	14 13 27	116 (87.9%) 16 (12.1%) 132
7/26/76	Male Female Total	136 (70.8% 56 (29.2% 192	39 28 67	17 2 19	5 5 10	75 (78.1%) 21 (21.9%) 96
Totals fo July, 197		837 (74.0% 294 (26.0%		100 8 108	43 37 80	449 (86.0%) 73 (14.0%) 522

General Population Characteristics



Exhibit

Table 35. Age by Race and Sex, for Counties: 1970-Continued

	(For minim;	im base for		jures (percer	nt, median,	etc.) and	meaning	of symbol	s, see fext)							
	1970 population				1970 population											
Counties	All roces		White		Negro		1960		All races		White		Negro		198	
	Total	Mole	Female	Male	Female	Mole	Female	popula- tion	Total	Mole	Female	Male	Female	Mole	Female	popul
				HOWA		400				*****		HOW		T		T
All ages Under 1 year 1 year 2 years	10 561 140 144 135	5 107 68 72 60	5 454 72 72 75	4 617 61 65 51	4 922 60 66 61	479 7 6	319 11 6 14	10 839 186 190 177	23 521 353 342 320	11 411 189 185 148	12 110 164 157 172	11 311 187 183 148	11 997 164 157 169	20	27	22 02 42 43 44
3 years. 4 years 5 years 6 years	136 150 163	68 86 86	68 64 77 74	59 73 70 83	55 57 69 61	9 13 15	13 7 8	187 200 198	322 350 352 403	168 158 176	154 192 176 205	167 156 176 193	153 191 173 201	-	1	45
7 years 8 years 9 years 10 years 10.	177 189 173 182	97 95 87 90	80 94 86 92	60 87 73 81	66 81 77 80	17 8 14 9	13 13 9 11	202 174 169 189	406 452 458 481	215 232 220 251	191 220 233 230	214 232 217 248	190 217 234 225	1	2	41
11 years	189 178 190 194 197	90 96 91	87 88 94 103 96	87 80 80 81	79 76 79 95 86	14 10 16 9	8 12 15 8	177 182 182 166	472 473 483 528 443	238 240 265 292 228	234 233 218 236 215	237 237 264 289 226	231 231 215 236 214	1	1	43 43 43 40
16 years	181 182 264 291	93 101 132 134	88 81 132 157	80 88 122 127	79 69 123 148	13 13 9 7	9 12 9 8	159 152 261 261	488 444 367 321	247 215 172 164	219 229 195 157	244 214 172 163	217 228 191 157	1	1	43 40 28 22
20 years 21 years and over 22 years and over 3 years 25 to 9 years 20 to 14 years 20 to 14 years 20 to 15 to 16 years 20	293 6 638 705 877 933	3 122 354 466 469	3 516 3 516 351 411 464	125 2 878 309 393 409	3 207 299 354 409	240 44 72 58	301 51 55 54	225 6 875 940 942 896	273 15 012 1 687 2 071 2 437	7 092 848 1 041 1 286	155 7 920 839 1 030 1 151	116 7 028 841 1 032 1 275	153 7 850 834 1 015 1 138	14	1 16 2 5	13 43 2 15 2 20 2 20 1 76
15 to 19 years 20 to 24 years 25 to 29 years 30 to 34 years	1 115 963 475 421	561 493 238 200	354 470 237 221	503 467 228 182	505 437 218	57 23 9	47 31 17 28	981 721 404 510	2 041 1 287 1 233 1 174	1 026 586 584 581	1 015 701 649 613	1 019 579 581 556	9 007 694 641 609	3	2 2	1 05
35 to 39 years 40 to 44 years 45 to 49 years 50 to 54 years	505 544 526 601	198 263 254 253 287	233 242 290 273 314	193 244 235 236 250	216 219 262 248 291	14 19 19 17 27	17 23 28 24 24 23	514 554 628 624 642	1 212 1 310 1 353 1 400 1 360	584 625 639 676 644	628 685 715 724 716	581 621 634 670 637	624 680 705 716 709	2	3 2 5	1 16 1 28 1 34 1 27 1 25 1 17
60 to 64 years. 65 to 69 years. 70 to 74 years. 75 to 79 years.	593 541 475 372 267	285 240 216 155 100	308 301 259 217 167	266 220 188 140 87	283 268 231 198 157	19 20 28 15 13	25 32 28 18 10	618 608 515 407 213	1 404 1 241 921 683 444	655 608 427 312 199	749 633 494 371 245	644 600 422 311 197	742 630 490 368 244	3 2	3 - 1	1 08 1 01 86 60 32
85 years and over	3 075 2 232	75 1 584 961	1 491 1 271	67 1 365 864	135 1 296 1 162	215 97	7 191 107	3 237 2 255	263 7 548 4 424	3 865 2 054	3 683 2 370	3 832 2 029	3 646 2 353	5 4	9 2	7 82 3 63 2 99
65 years and over	1 872 32.5	786 29.4	1 086 35.4	702 30 0	989 36.1	21.8	95 30.6	1 885 35.3	3 552 34.3	33.0	1 895 35.5	33.0 JACKS	35.5	50.0	42.5	32.
All ages	9 529	4 642	4 887	4 604	4 857			8 041	414 119	309 421	344 131					
Under I year	180 159 154 183 175	91 86 63 97	89 73 91 86 80	91 85 62 97 93	88 73 90 86 80	1 2	18	145 156 152 145 160	654 558 11 248 10 428 9 823 10 492 11 087	5 678 5 360 4 913 5 337 5 617	345 137 5 570 5 068 4 910 5 155 5 470	254 457 4 423 4 197 3 788 4 197 4 326	283 141 4 249 3 968 3 808 3 932 4 154	32 986 1 214 1 137 1 081 1 115 1 252	39 901 1 281 1 079 1 068 1 185 1 286	14 84 14 62 14 30 13 84 13 54
5 years	173 191 172 194 170	88 91 89 103 92	85 100 83 87 78	88 91 88 105 91	85 99 82 89 78		1	140 156 148 157 136	11 901 12 376 12 873 13 101 13 417	5 983 6 368 6 522 6 631 6 886	5 918 6 008 6 351 6 470 6 531	4 606 4 903 5 051 5 117 5 264	4 559 4 619 4 878 5 010 5 026	1 344 1 419 1 432 1 476 1 588	1 324 1 349 1 441 1 417 1 459	13 22 12 35 12 05 11 59
10 years 11 years 12 years 13 years	189 195 175 177 195	99 104 91 90 93	90 91 84 87 102	99 102 90 88 93	89 91 83 86	1 1 2	1	158 180 183 179 156	13 881 13 167 13 201 12 785 12 583	6 981 6 774 6 742 6 491 6 412	6 900 6 393 6 459 6 294 6 171	5 350 5 174 5 272 5 104 5 933	5 203 4 899 4 933 4 818 4 843	1 597 1 556 1 434 1 345 1 339	1 647 1 458 1 487 1 449 1 298	10 55 10 46 10 34 10 57 10 33 7 73
15 years	167 184 160 115 120	91 110 74 67 51	76 74 86 48 69	107 73 66 50	76 74 83 47	3 1	3	179 160 151 135	12 116 11 489 11 189 10 634	6 126 5 735 5 708 5 089	5 990 5 754 5 483 5 565	4 838 4 589 4 642 4 112	4 680 4 527 4 326 4 494	1 248 1 108 1 030 920	1 189 1 124 1 037	7 57 7 76 7 84 7 31
19 years	100 6 001 851 900	39 2 836 432 465	3 165 419 435	39 2 817 428 463	61 3 148 417 433	10	10	85 76 4 904 758 737	9 680 9 585 407 502 53 378 63 668	4 229 3 887 185 974 26 905 32 390	5 451 5 698 221 528 26 173 31 278	3 401 3 133 157 947 20 921 24 941	4 384 4 604 187 227 20 111 24 092	802 726 26 805 5 799 7 259	1 033 1 054 32 969 5 899 6 990	6 90 7 10 397 81 71 16 59 77
10 to 14 years	931 746 599 606	477 393 266 299	454 353 333 307	472 385 265 299	349 331 306	4 7 -	2 4	856 710 357 354	65 617 55 108 51 457 46 451	33 400 26 865 22 550 22 456	32 217 28 243 28 907 23 995	25 933 21 582 19 069 18 942	24 696 22 411 24 002 19 784	7 271 5 108 3 300 3 317	7 339 5 650 4 700 4 009	37 40 38 38 41 15
30 to 34 years	495 456 460 436 505 562	245 245 227 213 242 266	255 211 233 223 263 2°6	239 244 224 211 239 268	253 209 232 222 262 293	1 2 2 2	1	383 417 425 502 490 401	37 648 35 995 38 729 39 417 34 859 31 617	18 416 17 397 18 670 19 112 16 200 14 565	19 232 18 598 20 059 20 305 18 659 17 052	15 393 14 598 15 743 16 167 13 912 12 499	15 581 14 999 16 452 17 078 15 870 14 759	2 860 2 690 2 825 2 833 2 209 2 007	3 471 3 446 3 468 3 115 2 701 2 235	43 15 43 99 39 05 37 42 35 32 32 95
60 to 64 years 65 to 69 years 70 to 74 years 75 to 79 years 80 to 84 years	538 454 347 262 198	265 212 174 108 56	273 242 173 154 142	263 208 173 108 55	271 241 173 153 142	3	1	409 415 340 241 150	28 554 23 953 19 367 14 051 8 851	12 730 9 937 7 622 5 113 3 019	15 824 14 016 11 745 8 938 5 832	10 984 8 519 8 514 4 434	13 780 12 165 10 407 8 050 5 306	1 696 1 359 1 067 654 389	1 983 1 802 1 292 861 497	27 92- 24 00: 18 58: 12 26:
85 years and over Under 18 years 62 years and over 65 years and over	183 3 193 1 727 1 444	62 1 647 739 612	121 1 544 998 832	62 1 632 733 606	121 1 532 985 830	12 4 4	7 2 1	96 2 841 1 487 1 242	6 138 217 137 88 924 72 360	2 074 110 262 35 068 27 763	4 064 106 895 53 856 44 595	2 603 1 723 85 864 30 107 23 793	3 598 82 432 47 643 39 526	325	443 23 808 5 997 4 895	6 49 4 22 203 58 82 31 65 55

27-168 MISSOURI

GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTIC

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

TERM, 1978

No. 27-7012

CLIFFORD R. COMBS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

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TABLE OF CASES

State v. Combs, 564 S.W.2d 328 (Mo.Ct.App. at K.C. 1978);

State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. banc 1977);

<u>Taylor</u> v. <u>Louisiana</u>, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975);

Article I, §22(b), Missouri Constitution

Article XII, §41, Louisiana Constitution (since repealed)

Section 494.010, RSMo. 1969

Section 494.020, RSMo. 1969, as amended

Section 494.031, RSMo. 1969, as amended

Section 497.130, RSMo. 1969, as amended

Chapter 497, RSMo. 1969, as amended

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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CLIFFORD R. COMBS,
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v.

STATE OF MISSOURI,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion and decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals is reported at 564 S.W.2d 328 (Mo.Ct.App. at K.C. 1978). A copy of the opinion appears as petitioner's Appendix A.

JURISDICTION

On February 27, 1978, the Missouri Court of Appeals issued its opinion affirming the petitioner's conviction for one count of burglary second degree, and one count of stealing. Thereafter, on March 14, 1978, the petitioner filed a timely motion for rehearing. On April 3, 1978, the petitioner's motion for rehearing was overruled. Thereafter, an application to transfer the cause to the Missouri Supreme Court was filed on April 18, 1978, which application was denied on May 9, 1978. On June 30, 1978, the petitioner filed with this Court a petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court. On August 15, 1978, the respondent was

direc' and to file a response in the instant case.

The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under Title 28, United States Code, \$1257(3).

QUESTION PRESENTED

WHETHER THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL BY VIRTUE OF THE PROVISION OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION
WHICH PERMITS WOMEN TO DECLINE JURY SERVICE?

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, §22(b), of the Missouri Constitution, §494.020, §494.031, and Chapter 497 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 1969 as amended. The Missouri constitutional and statutory provisions mentioned above are set out in full in the respondent's Appendix A.

STATEMENT

In December of 1976 the petitioner, Clifford R. Combs, was tried for, and convicted of, one count of burglary second degree and one count of stealing. Prior to trial, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the jury panel "that may be produced as prospective jurors", claiming that Article I, \$22(b) of the Missouri Constitution operates to deny the petitioner a jury panel selected from a fair cross-section of the community. In support of his motion, the petitioner introduced Defendant's Exhibit 1 (a copy of which appears in petitioner's Appendix B). Defendant's Exhibit 1 is a stipulation entered into by the petitioner and the State of Missouri.

Briefly, the stipulation outlines the process by which jury wheels in Jackson County, Missouri are created, and prospective jurors are summoned. In paragraph 3, the stipulation presents a statistical analysis of the questionnaires returned by women in the process of assembling the 1976 jury wheel for Jackson County, Missouri.

By way of the stipulation, the petitioner sought to introduce evidence that women comprise 54.4% of the population of Jackson County, twenty-one years of age and older, that the petitioner's jury venire of twenty-four contained six women, and that approximately 29.1% of the 1976 Jackson County jury wheel was comprised of females. Additionally, the petitioner introduced evidence that women accounted for the following percentages of those who were summoned and appeared for jury service in the seven months preceding the petitioner's trial; January of 1976 - 12.3%; February of 1976 - 17.6%; March of 1976 - 17.0%; April of 1976 - 16.0%; May of 1976 - 13.0%; June of 1976 - 13.6%; and July of 1976 - 14.0%. Finally, the petitioner introduced evidence of a statistical analysis of those questionnaires which were mailed to voters for the purpose of assembling a 1976 jury wheel for Jackson County. The results of that analysis concluded that, of 30,165 questionnaires mailed to women, "[q]uestionnaires indicating that women declined to serve for no other apparent reason than the female exemption" were returned by 21,884 women.

Upon consideration of the petitioner's motion to quash the prospective jury panel, and the stipulation introduced in support thereof, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion.

Following the petitioner's trial and conviction, an appeal was taken to the Missouri Court of Appeals. In essence, the basis of the petitioner's argument on appeal was identical to that now advanced by the petitioner; that the exemption permitted by Article I, §22(b) of the Missouri Constitution operated to deny the petitioner the right to trial by a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community.

On February 27, 1978 the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner's conviction in an opinion contained in 564 S.W.2d 328. The court briefly disposed of the petitioner's constitutional arguments, citing the Missouri Supreme Court decision in State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. banc 1977), a case in which this Court will hear argument during the October Term on a Writ of Certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court. The petitioner's motion for rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals on April 3, 1978, while his motion to transfer was denied by the Missouri Supreme Court on May 9, 1978.

In order to fully understand the question presented by this case, it is necessary to consider the jury selection system which is employed in Jackson County, Missouri. That system is mandated by §494.031, §494.020, and Chapter 497 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1969 as amended and Article I, §22(b) of the Missouri Constitution. Each of these provisions appears in respondent's Appendix A.

The jury selection system in Jackson County begins with that county's voter registration list. From that list, the jury commissioner selects, at random and by computer, approximately 65,000 names. A questionnaire is then sent to each individual selected. A copy of that questionnaire appears in \$497.130, RSMo., 1969 as amended, respondent's Appendix A. Among other things, the questionnaire notifies women of their right to be excused from jury duty. When the questionnaires are returned, the jury commissioner eliminates the names of all individuals whose questionnaire indicates that he has exercised his right to be excused, or that he is unqualified to serve as a juror. *

The remaining pool of names is then entered into a computer, and nearly 28,000 names are randomly selected for the master jury wheel. If an individual fails to return the questionnaire, that individual's name is automatically included in the pool from which the master jury wheel is selected. In Jackson County, a new jury wheel is prepared each year.

Individuals are periodically selected from the master jury wheel by computer to make up the general jury panel for all civil and criminal divisions of the Jackson County Circuit Court. By random selection from the jury wheel, individuals are summoned to jury service. The summonses include a notification to women that they have a right to be excused from jury duty. After receiving a summons, an individual is given the opportunity to present to the circuit court reasons why he or she would be unable to serve as a juror. All jurors who are not excused should appear in the circuit court for jury duty. If a woman does not appear, it is assumed that she has exercised her right not to serve. Venire panels are then randomly selected from the individuals who have appeared for jury duty, and a petit jury is selected from the venire panel. In the petitioner's case, the record indicates that his jury venire of twenty-four contained six women, while his petit jury of twelve included one woman.

ARGUMENT

The decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals in State
of Missouri v. Clifford R. Combs is not in conflict with this
Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct.
692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), in that Article I, §22(b) of the Missouri
Constitution does not operate to exclude women from jury service.

In <u>Taylor</u> v. <u>Louisiana</u>, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) (hereinafter, <u>"Taylor"</u>), this Court held that the jury selection system employed by the State of Louisiana deprived criminal defendants of their right to an impartial trial.

In order to promote an orderly and efficient judicial system, certain individuals are excluded from jury service by §494.020, RSMo. 1969 as amended. For example, licensed attorneys and those unable to understand the English language may not serve on jurys in Missouri. Section 494.031, RSMo., 1969 as amended, on the other hand, allows certain individuals to be excused from jury duty if they take a timely application to the court. For example, persons over 65 years of age, doctors of medicine, school teachers, government workers, and clergy may apply to be excused. Also, Article I, §22(b) of the Missouri Constitution mandates that the court shall excuse any woman who requests exemption before she is sworn.

Louisiana Constitutional Article XII, §41 (since repealed) sets out the constitutionally offensive procedure:

"The legislature shall provide for the election and drawing of competent and intelligent jurors for the trial of civil and criminal cases; provided, however, that no women shall be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed with the clerk of the district court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to such service. . . "

This Court concluded that the above-quoted provision operated to <u>systematically exclude</u> women from jury service, and therefore, deprived criminal defendants of a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community.

Relying on the decision in Taylor, the petitioner argues that he too has been deprived of his rights to a fair trial because Article I, \$22(b) of the Missouri Constitution allows women to avoid jury duty by requesting an exemption. The Louisiana constitutional provision cited, and Article I, §22(b) of the Missouri Constitution, however, are readily distinguishable. Under the constitutionally offersive Louisiana system, a woman would not have been eligible for jury service unless she were to have taken affirmative steps to inform the court of her desire to serve as a juror. In Missouri, however, women are automatically included in the jury list. They are excused from jury service only when they take affirmative steps to notify the courts that they do not wish to serve. The Missouri system of jury selection, therefore, does not exclude women. It merely permits women to actively seek exemption from jury service. This Court's opinion in Taylor stated ". . . jury wheels, pools of names, panels or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof." (Emphasis added)

Taylor, supra, at 538. While the petitioner relies on the above-quoted language from Taylor, it is evident that Missouri does not use the force of its law to exclude women from juries. On the contrary, Missouri merely permits women, through Article I, \$22(b) of the Missouri Constitution, to exempt themselves from juries. Simply stated, Missouri excludes no women from jury service on the basis of their gender. The distinction between Louisiana's "opton" system and Missouri's "opt-off" system is crucial and dispositive.

Taylor also indicates that a defendant must show that the jury wheels from which juries are chosen fail to represent a cross-section of the community. The petitioner has asserted that he has met the burden of proof imposed by Taylor. The jury statistics in Taylor, however, outline a factual framework which is radically different from that with which we deal in this cause. In Taylor, 53% of the persons eligible for jury service were female, while no more than 10% of the persons on the jury wheel involved were women. In marked contrast, while in Jackson County the petitioner suggests that 54.4% of the persons eligible for jury service are women, the 1976 jury wheel list was comprised of slightly less than 29.1% females. Additionally, in Taylor there were no females in the 175 person jury venire. In the present case, there were 6 women on the petitioner's jury panel of 24, and one woman on his petit jury. It thus seems clear that this Court in Taylor was confronted by a Louisiana jury selection system which departed significanlty from that which Missouri employs, and was confronted with lopsided statistics which bear no relationship to those produced by the petitioner in this case.

This case is plagued with evidentiary problems which will prevent this Court from reaching the question of whether the defendant's right to a fair trial has been denied.

The petitioner alleges that the exemption from jury service permitted females in Missouri causes gross under-representation of women on jury panels. The record in this case, however, fails to demonstrate, in a convincing fashion, any relationship between Article I, §22(b), and the alleged under-representation of women on juries in Jackson County.

First, the petitioner has failed to present eligible population statistics for the year of his trial. The stipulation introduced by the petitioner in support of his motion to quash included 1970 United States Census figures which show that Jackson County had approximately 407,000 inhabitants twenty-one years of age or older. Approximately 54% of those inhabitants were women. The annual Jackson County jury selection process, however, begins with a current voter registration list. No proof has been made that the sexes register to vote in direct relation to their numbers, or that there was not a significant change in the population makeup of Jackson County, Missouri, between 1970 and 1976 when the petitioner's jury was selected. As stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. banc 1977):

"All of this suggests that statistics of current 'eligible population' referred to in Alexander v.

Louisiana, supra, not six year old gross population figures, provide the proper starting point." State v. Duren, supra, at 16.

Finally, certain other statistics presented by the petitioner in support of his argument are unpersuasive.

Specifically, the stipulation which the petitioner incorporates in his Appendix B refers, in paragraph 3, to certain data compiled on the questionnaires sent to potential jury members from Jackson County during 1976. The petitioner contends that these statistics demonstrate that 72.6% of the 30,165 women receiving the questionnaire opted-off jury service merely because, as females, they were permitted to do so by Missouri law. This conclusion remains unsupported.

The questionnaire which is the subject of the petitioner's stipulation was sent to prospective jurors in Jackson County, and filled out and returned by them in accordance with \$497.130, RSMo., 1969 as amended. The petitioner's statistics indicate that 21,884 questionnaires (72.6% of those mailed to females) were returned "indicating that the women declined to serve for no other apparent reason than the female exemption." (Emphasis added, petitioner's Appendix B, stipulation, paragraph 3).

The last paragraph of the questionnaire reads: "TO WOMEN:

"The constitution permits women to elect to serve or not to serve as jury women. Any woman who elects not to serve will fill out this paragraph and mail this questionnaire to the jury commissioner at once. It will not be necessary to answer the other questions.

I elect not to perform jury service.

Signature"

The sentence, "[i]t will not be necessary to answer the other questions" suggests that unascertainable numbers of the 21,884 women who returned questionnaires having signed

at the bottom of the paragraph quoted above did simply that; signed at the bottom of the paragraph and declined to fill out the rest of the questionnaire. The petitioner attempts to suggest that all questionnaires so returned were the questionnaries of women who were only subject to exemption from jury service by virtue of their gender. This suggestion is unsubstantiated. There is no proof offered that every woman who chose to simply sign her name was without the requisite qualifications for any number of other possible exemptions. If, for example, a woman was also a lawyer or a physician, the exemption she would have had for her profession would not have been noted on the questionnaire if she had merely expedited matters by signing the last paragraph. As a result, an indeterminate number of women who merely signed and returned the questionnaire might have had a basis for exemption for all those reasons listed in questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12 of the questionnaire.

From the evidence produced by the petitioner, it has not been proved that all of those women returning a question-naire who signed only the last paragraph were incapable of having themselves excluded on grounds other than gender and Article I, \$22(b) of the Missouri Constitution. As a result, the petitioner has failed to prove that his jury was illegally constituted by virtue of Missouri's female exemption provisions.

Even if every questionnaire returned by a female was completely filled out, and if every one revealed no other possible basis for an exemption other than gender, that fact alone would still not demonstrate that those women would not have been exempted from jury service for other reasons recognized by Missouri, and unchallenged by the petitioner.

For instance, under §494.031, RSMo., 1969 as amended, a woman might have had an exemption for being an officer or

employee of the Executive, Legislative or Judicial branches of a federal, state, or county government. Likewise, if her jury service would be adverse to the public interest, or if it would impose an undue hardship on her, she would have received an exemption. Under §494.020, RSMo., 1969 as amended, a woman whose questionnaire when completely filled out revealed no apparent basis for an exemption, other than her gender, would nonetheless have been excluded had she been convicted of a felony, been unable to read, speak or write English, or not been correctly drawn. Similarly, §494.010, RSMo., 1969 as amended, demands that jurors be over twenty-one years of age, sober, intelligent citizens of the state, and residents of the city or county served by the jury.

All of the exemptions mentioned above might have been applicable to a woman whose questionnaire indicated only that she was a female and that none of the other exemptions specifically listed on the face of the questionnaire was applicable.

In conclusion, the petitioner's bare recital of the number of women who returned questionnaires having signed only the female exemption paragraph is not convincing. An unascertained number of those questionnaires could have come from women who could, on the face of the questionnaire, have received exemptions on another basis, or who, after having filled out the entire questionnaire, might nonetheless have received exemptions under \$494.031, \$494.020 or \$494.010, RSMo., 1969 as amended.

It should be noted that in <u>Taylor</u> the parties stipulated that "the discrepancy between females eligible for jury service and those actually included in the venire was the

result of the operation of the Louisiana constitution".

Taylor, supra, at 524. The parties in the present action have entered to no such stipulation. As a result, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Article I, \$22(b) of the Missouri Constitution operates to deny him his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the respondent respectfully requests that this Court deny the petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

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